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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM C. MOORE & COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DELFINO SANCHEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AND 
WILLIAM G. MOORE & COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ILIFF GARDNER, 






STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent makes no objection to Appellants' consoli-
dation of the above cases. The issues of law and the plead-
ings in the two cases are identical, except for an insignifi-
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cant difference in dollars and dates. We will consider the 
two cases as one, except where evidence is dealt with. 
The letter "R" refers to pages of the record on appeal; 
"SR" refers to pages of the supplemental record; "DS" 
refers to pages of the deposition of defendant Sanchez, and 
"DG" refers to the pages of the deposition of defendant 
Gardner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts is inaccurate and unnec-
essarily involved. 
The complaint alleged that the defendant executed an 
order in writing, requesting the plaintiff to sell to the 
defendant nursery stock; that by the terms of the order the 
plaintiff promised to pay a stipulated sum for the nursery 
stock, plus shipping charges within five days after ship-
ment and receipt of the stock ; that the plaintiff accepted 
the order, and delivered the nursery stock to a common 
carrier in 1\Iissouri with directions to transport it to Utah, 
and there surrender it to the defendant; that the nursery 
stock duly arrived in Utah, and was surrendered to the 
defendant, and that the defendant failed to pay for the 
stock. The complaint then stated that the order contained 
a promise to pay collection costs and expenses, and a rea-
sonable attorney's fee if the account should be placed with 
an attorney for collection; that defendant's account was 
placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, and that 
$75.00 was a reasonable sum to be allowed the plaintiff 
for attorney's fees (R. 1, 2). 
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The answers of the defendants were identical except 
for dates and figures. Three numbered defenses were in-
terposed. The first was that the complaint did not state 
a cause of action. The second set up that the plaintiff was 
a a foreign corporation, and has not qualified to do business 
in Utah, but was conducting business in this State as though 
it were fully qualified. The third consisted of admissions 
and denials of parts of the complaint, and also certain af-
firmative allegations. The only allegations in the complaint 
that were controverted were those relating to the contents 
of the order and the reasonableness of the attorney's fee. 
(We are aware that defendant denies the allegations in 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint, but in each instance 
this denial is nullified by an affirmative allegation). In-
terwoven among the admissions, denials and allegations of 
the third defense are some generalizations with respect to 
the quality of the stock and representations made at the 
time the orders were taken (R. ?, 4, 5). These allegations 
will be considered further at a later point in this brief. 
The plaintiff moved to strike the second defense from 
the defendants' answer upon the ground that it did not 
state facts sufficient to constitute a defense (R. 7). A 
hearing was had upon this motion, during which certain 
facts were admitted by appellants' attorney (SR. 2-12). The 
motion to strike was granted (R. 9). 
Thereafter, plaintiff moved the court for a summary 
judgment in its favor on the ground that no genuine issue 
of fact was involved (R. 10). The motion was based upon 
the pleadings, the order of the court striking the second 
defense, and parts of the deposition of the defendants (R. 
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10). The defendants did not appear either in person or b 
attorney at the hearing on the motion (R. 12) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE SALE OF THE NURSERY STOCK WAS A 
TRANSACTION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE 
RELATING TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
DOING BUSINESS IN UTAH. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS EN-




THE SALE OF THE NURSERY STOCK WAS A 
TRANSACTION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE 
RELATING TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
DOING BUSINESS IN UTAH. 
The second defense which was stricken asserted tha 
the contract sued upon was void, because the plaintiff, 
foreign corporation, was doing business in Utah withou 
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having complied with the provisions of Sections 1 to 3, 
Chapter 8, Title 16, U. C. A., 1953. These sections provide 
in effect that every foreign corporation before doing any 
business within this State shall file certain documents in 
the Office of the County Clerk. Any foreign corporation 
doing business within this State and failing to comply with 
the statute cannot maintain any action in the courts of this 
~: ~- State on any contract, agreement or transaction made or 
~- entered into in Utah by such corporation. Such contract, 
t 
agreement or transaction is void as to the foreign corpora-
:~\ 
tion, but enforceable against it. 
It is the contention of respondent that the statute re-
ferred to has no application to the transaction sued upon 
for the reason that in selling the nursery stock the plain-
tiff was engaged in interstate commerce. This statute makes 
void only contracts made or entered into in the State of 
t· Utah. The contract sued upon was not made or entered 
into in the State of Utah, but was made and entered into 
in a foreign state. The record is plain and uncontroverted 
to the effect that the order for the nursery stock was signed 
by the defendant in Utah and transmitted to the plaintiff 
in New York (R. 1-5; SR. 4-6; DS; DG.). The order pro-
vided that it should become a binding contract only after 
its receipt at the home office of the seller and when signed 
or approved by an executive of the seller, also that "this 
sale is made and is to be performed in the State of New 
York" (Ex. A. See SR. 5). The nursery stock was de-
livered to a common carrier outside of the State of Utah 
with instructions to transport it to the defendant and de-
liver it to him in Utah (SR. 6). The stock was received 
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by the defendant from the common carrier, and was plantE 
by him (DS. 4, 5; DG. 14-16). 
Both the decisions of this court and of the Supren 
Court of the United States have held that the transactio 
involved in the case at bar constitutes interstate commer< 
and is not and cannot be made invalid or unenforceable b 
a state statute which makes void any contract made in Uta 
by a foreign corporation doing business in this State witl 
out a license. 
In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc. v. Stohl, 7 
Utah 124, 283 Pac. 731, the question involved was whethe 
the sale of a threshing machine was a transaction in inte1 
state commerce. The seller was a foreign corporation whic 
had not complied with the laws of Utah relating to foreig 
corporations doing business in this State. The order fo 
the machinery was solicited by a representative of the selle 
and was signed by the buyer in Utah. The order was the 
trans1nitted to the seller in Indiana. The order provide 
that it would not be binding upon the seller until accepte 
by it at its office in Indiana. The machinery was shippe 
from Indiana to Utah and there delivered to the buyer. J 
representative of the seller came to Utah to assemble tb 
machine and put it in working condition. Upon this stat 
of facts, this court held : 
"From this evidence we are convinced the tranl 
action in suit is an interstate one. The order w~ 
signed in Utah, sent to the Idaho branch office, an 
accepted by the company in Indiana. Cooper Mil 
Co. v. Ferguson. 113 U. S. 727, 5 S. Ct. 739, 28 1 
Ed. 1137. "''e are also satisfied that the work < 
setting up the machinery by experts of vendor a11 
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the adjusting of the same in order to make it work 
satisfactorily, although performed in this state, did 
not make the transaction an intrastate one as dis-
tinguished from interstate. The question is a fed-
eral one, and we are bound by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Defendant cites 
and relies on the case of Browning v. City of Way-
cross, 233 U. S. 16, 34 S. Ct. 578, 58 L. Ed. 828, but, 
since the decision in that case, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has fully settled the matter in 
the case of York Mfg Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21, 38 
S. Ct. 430, 62 L. Ed. 963, 11 A. L. R. 611, dis-
tinguishing the Browning Case. It was there held, 
citing the headnote, as follows: 
" 'A provision in a contract of sale of an 
artificial ice plant by which the foreign cor-
porate seller agreed to furnish an engineer who 
should assemble and erect the machinery at the 
point of destination, and should make a prac-
tical efficiency test before complete delivery, is 
relevant and appropriate to the interstate sale 
of the machinery, and, therefore, does not jus-
tify the courts of the state to which the ma-
chinery was shipped in refusing to enforce pay-
ment of the purchase price, on the theory that 
the corporation was doing local business in the 
state without having first secured the permit 
made by a state statute a condition precedent 
to the right to sue in the local courts.' 
"The facts in the instant case bring it fully 
within the decision of York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, supra. 
Other cases in point are Pfaudler Co. v. Westphal, 190 
Wis. 486, 209 N. W 700; Kaw Boiler Works Co. v. 
Interstate Refineries, Inc., 118 Kan. 693, 236 P. 654. 
"The mere fact that notes and mortgages were 
executed in Utah does not take the transaction out 
of interstate commerce any more than if cash had 
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been paid instead of the notes given. The executior 
of these documents is an incident to the original sale 
Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Spokesman Pub. Co. 
127 Or. 196, 270 P. 519. The transaction involve( 
in this case being an interstate one, the plaintiff if 
entitled to maintain its action notwithstanding i1 
has never complied with the laws of the state witb 
respect to foreign corporations doing business withir 
the state. Sioux Remedy Co. v Cope, 235 U. S. 197: 
35 S. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193." 
To the same effect are Miller Brewing Company v. 
Capitol Distributing Company, 94 Utah 43, 72 P. 2d 1056; 
Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Company v. Weber Packin~ 
Corp., 94 Utah 414, 73 P. 2d 1272; Riley Stoker Corp. v 
State Tax Commission, 3 Utah 2d 164, 280 P. 2d 967. 
As this court has pointed out, the decisions of thE 
Supreme Court of the United States are controlling upor 
the question of what transactions constitute interstate com 
merce That court has repeatedly decided that a transactior 
such as was had between the plaintiff and defendant ir 
this case constitutes interstate commerce, and that th« 
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution prohibits th« 
several states from imposing any burdens thereon, or de 
nying a party to such transaction the right to enforce thl 
contract in the state courts. 
In Internatio'nal Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 
30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed. 678, the plaintiff conducted : 
correspondence school in Pennsylvania. It employed solici 
tors in Kansas to procure students in Kansas to subscrib 
to the course. The student executed in Kansas an order fo 
the textbooks and courses of instruction, which order wa 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
sent by mail to the plaintiff's office in Pennsylvania. The 
I coures of study, the textbooks, and paraphernalia were then 
1 shipped by the plaintiff from Pennsylvania to Kansas by 
common carrier. The plaintiff's solicitors were paid a fixed 
salary and commission, and they collected from the students 
the tuition fees for the course of study. Kansas had a stat-
ute similar to our own statutes above cited, which required 
foreign corporations before doing business in Kansas to 
file certain documents and obtain a license. Like the Utah 
statute, the Kansas statute provided that a non-complying 
foreign corporation could not maintain any action in any 
of the courts of Kansas on any contract made by the foreign 
corporation who had not complied with the statute. 
The plaintiff brought suit in a State court of Kansas 
to collect the tuition fee from a student who had received 
and used the course of instruction, but who refused to pay 
upon the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with 
the above mentioned Kansas statute. The Supreme Court 
held that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant 
was part and parcel of an interstate transaction, that the 
Kansas statute imposed an unlawful burden upon such 
interstate transaction, and expressly decided that the at-
tempt of Kansas to deny plaintiff access to its courts for 
the enforcement of the contract was a violation of the Fed-
eral Constitution. The court said : 
"It is the established doctrine of this court that 
a State may not, in any form or under any guise, 
directly burden the prosecution of interstate busi-
ness. But such a burden is imposed when the cor-
poration of another State, lawfully engaged in in-
terstate commerce, is required, as a condition of its 
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right to prosecute its business in Kansas, to mak, 
and file a Statement setting forth certain fact 
which the State, confessedly, could not control b; 
legislation. It results that the provision as to th~ 
Statement mentioned in §1283 must fall before th~ 
Constitution of the United States, and with it-ac 
cording to the established rules of statutory con 
struction-must fall that part of the same sectim 
which provides that the obtaining of the certificau 
of the Secretary of State that such Statement hru 
been properly made shall be a condition precedent t< 
the right of the plaintiff to maintain an action ir 
the courts of Kansas. * * *" 
The International Textbook case has been followed anc 
approved in so many cases that it would require pages oj 
this brief to cite. 
We do not concede that there is any possibility of thE 
defendants' counsel being able to sustain his sweeping clairr. 
that the plaintiff has been extensively engaged in busines~ 
in Utah. The point is that it is immaterial whether thE 
plaintiff was engaged in business in Utah without a license, 
Regardless of its activities in Utah outside of the transac-
tions with the defendants, the Constitution of the United 
States requires that those transactions be upheld. 
Defendants' counsel had no answer to the trial court'~ 
observation that the most the defendants could probabl~ 
prove was that the plaintiff had engaged in a number o1 
interstate transactions similar to those sued upon in thesE 
actions (SR. 8) . 
The question presented by the motion to strike is no· 
whether the issue of doing business in Utah is one of fac· 
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to be determined after trial. The controlling inquiry is 
whether that issue is immaterial. The authorities to the 
effect that the transaction is interstate in character demon-
strate that the issue is immaterial. Appellants' brief com-
pletely ignores the point. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Appellant's brief touching the above point consists 
almost entirely of citations of authorities which announce 
.the elementary proposition that a summary judgment can 
be sustained in only those cases where no genuine issue of 
fact is involved. There is no discussion of any claimed issue 
of fact in this case other than the bare assertion that the 
answer put in issue "the question as to whether or not there 
had been a complete failure of consideration in the delivery 
of the goods to the defendant," also "the question of dam-
ages due to the misrepresentations and misstatements of 
the agents of the plaintiff." 
We submit that the asserted issues with respect to 
failure of consideration and misrepresentation exist only in 
appellant's brief. Neither of these defenses was presented 
in the defendant's answer. Each is an affirmative defense 
and must be set forth in the answer (Rule 12 (b) U. R. C. 
P.). 
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All that is there stated with respect to consideration 
is that said "purported nursery stock was of no value as 
nearly all of said stock was dead upon arrival," and a de-
nial that "any award of attorney's fees should be made 
in that there has been a complete failure of consideration 
in the goods as shipped by plaintiff to defendant" (R. 3-5). 
These allegations are not sufficient to raise the issue of 
failure of consideration. See County v. Hobbs, 72 Iowa 69, 
33 N. W. 368, 17 C. J. S. Section 555, page 1190. 
The plea of fraud is likewise insufficient to present 
any defense. Rule 9 (b) U. R. C. P. requires that in all 
averments of fraud the circumstances constituting the fraud 
must be stated with particularity. These circumstances or 
elements of fraud which must be particularly stated are 
that the representation must be of a fact as distinguished 
from opinions, conclusions and sales talk. Stuck v. Delta 
Land & Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791. Second 
the representations must be reasonably relied upon. Lewis 
v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d 865, and damage must 
have resulted from the reliance upon the representations. 
Baird v. E.flo Investment Company, 76 Utah 232, 289 P. 
112; Campbell v. Zions Cooperative Home Building & Real 
Estate Company, 46 Utah 1, 148 Pac. 401. 
While the above authorities fully sustain our position 
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the plead-
ings, there are additional grounds to support the judgment 
appealed from. The motion for summary judgment was 
based upon the depositions of the defendants, as well as 
upon the pleadings and other matters of record. A refer-
ence to the depositions is all that is necessary to dispose of 
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any claimed defense based upon either failure of consider-
ation or fraud. With respect to the condition of the nursery 
stock upon its arrival, defendant Gardner admitted that the 
stock corresponded exactly to that order and was in proper 
condition for planting (DG. 14-17). All of it was planted, 
and all of it grew (DG. 19-23). It is true that there 
is some testimony that a small part of the stock winter 
killed, which was undoubtedly due to the very unusual 
winter which followed the planting. This defendant's tes-
timony precludes any possible finding that any part of the 
stock was dead upon arrival. He never notified the plain-
tiff or made any complaint that any of the stock was dead, 
or that it failed to grow, and no request was made for any 
replacement (DG. 19-23). 
Although the deposition of defendant Sanchez is con-
tradictory and uncertain in some respects, it is clear to the 
effect that he planted all of the stock, and that only a few 
items failed to grow (DS. 5-7). He also failed to make any 
complaint or request any replacements (DS. 8). 
The contract provides that plaintiff will replace all 
nursery stock that fails to live the first year, provided the 
purchaser has paid as agreed and the stock was promptly 
planted on arrival and given proper care (Ex. A). It pro-
vides further that no cash discount or refund is allowed for 
any nursery stock that does not grow (Ex. A). In view of 
these provisions of the contract and the facts admitted by 
the defendants in their depositions, any defense predicated 
upon failure of consideration fails as a matter of law. 
The consideration for the defendant's promise to pay 
was the plaintiff's promise to transfer the list of nursery 
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stock and to replace any of the stock that failed to grow 
the first year. The plaintiff has not failed or refused to 
perform its undertaking. It has never received any notice 
that any of the stock failed to grow the first year, and no 
request for replacement has ever been made. Since the plain-
tiff is not in default under the contract, there has been no 
failure of consideration. 
The recent decision of this court in Van Tassell, et al. 
v. Lew-is, et al., 118 Utah 356, 222 P. 2d 350, is in point 
upon the question of claimed failure of consideration. This 
was an action to set aside a deed from the plaintiff Van 
Tassell to the defendant Lewis covering real property in 
Duchesne County. The consideration for the conveyance 
was the undertaking of the defendant to pay a certain sum 
of money and perform other acts. The promise to perform 
one of these acts was made after the conveyance. The other 
acts were performed and the money was paid. This court 
held there was no failure of consideration. We quote from 
the opinion : 
"In order for the plaintiffs to prevail in this 
action brought by them to cancel their deed to the 
Duchesne property on the ground that there has 
been a failure of consideration for the conveyance, 
it is incumbent upon them to demonstrate that they 
have not received everything that they bargained for 
as payment for that property. * * *" 
This is the situation presented in the case under con-
sideration. The plaintiff is not in default and has not 
refused to comply with its promise to replace any stock 
that failed to grow, because it has never been notified that 
any of the stock failed to grow and has never been requested 
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to replace any of it. Even if it be assumed that the plead-
ings raise an issue with respect to failure of consideration, 
the depositions of the defendants conclusively establish that 
the defense is not available to the defendants. 
The depositions of the defendants likewise dispose of 
any defense based upon fraud, even if we indulge the violent 
assumption that such a defense was raised by the pleadings. 
Each defendant was positive that no representations with 
respect to the quality or character of the nursery stock 
was made by any representative of the plaintiff (DS. 8-9; 
DG. 27). Gardner did testify that some statements were 
made with respect to the price or value of the stock, but 
these constituted no more than mere opinions and "puffing" 
statements (DG. 27, 28). The authorities above cited dem-
onstrate that no actionable misrepresentation was made, 
and that a defense predicated upon fraud cannot be sus-
tained. 
Rule 56 (c) provides that a judgment shall forthwith 
be rendered upon motion if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. The pleadings, deposi-
tions, and admissions on file in this case show no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and plaintiff was entitled to 
a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed no error in striking the ailE 
ations in the answer to the effect that plaintiff was doin, 
business in Utah without a license. These allegations ar 
immaterial and constituted no defense to the plaintiff' 
claim. 
No error was committed in granting the plaintiff' 
subsequent motion for a summary judgment in its favor 
Under the pleadings, the depositions and admissions, n~ 
genuine issue of fact was presented, and plaintiff was en 
titled to recover as a matter of law. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should b1 
affirmed. 
GRANT H. BAGLEY and 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., for 
VAN COTT BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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